Friday, January 10, 2014

who lost Fallujah?

It's discouraging that jihadist forces have captured Fallujah, the Iraqi city that was the scene of such bitter fighting and U.S. casualties a decade ago. It's also discouraging that U.S. politicians are using this development to try to score domestic political points.

Senators McCain and Graham claim that President Obama failed to secure a continuing U.S. troop presence in Iraq that somehow could have prevented the fall of Fallujah.

I agree instead with the fact-based rebuttal provided by Senator Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee:
That argument ignores some important history. First, it ignores the fact that the 2011 withdrawal date for U.S. forces in Iraqi was not set by President Obama, but by President Bush. In December of 2008, just before he left office, President Bush signed an agreement with the Iraqi government that called for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities in 2009, and the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011. President Bush himself, standing next to Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad as they announced their agreement, said: “The agreement lays out a framework for the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq.” So the 2011 withdrawal date was set by President Bush, not President Obama.
As to whether our military commanders objected to our withdrawal from Iraq, here’s what happened: While there was no mention from President Bush or Prime Minister Maliki when they announced their agreement of a U.S. troop presence after 2011, Secretary Gates and others discussed the possibility of some forces remaining in Iraq after 2011. And then, during 2011, the Obama administration entered into negotiations with the Iraqi government with the goal of keeping some U.S. troops, in limited roles, in Iraq to assist Iraqi security forces after the 2011 withdrawal date set by President Bush. I and many other members of Congress supported the idea of continuing a smaller, specialized U.S. military assistance force. While there was disagreement in the administration over the size of a residual force, what decided the issue wasn’t how many troops would remain. Rather, it was the Iraqi government’s refusal to agree to legal protections for residual U.S. troops, whatever their number. In the absence of such protections, it was the opinion of our military leaders that no U.S. forces should remain in Iraq, regardless of whether the number was 3,500 or 20,000.
- See more at: http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/speeches/speech/levin-floor-statement-on-the-situation-in-iraq1#sthash.7MkZIChJ.dpuf
That argument ignores some important history. First, it ignores the fact that the 2011 withdrawal date for U.S. forces in Iraqi was not set by President Obama, but by President Bush. In December of 2008, just before he left office, President Bush signed an agreement with the Iraqi government that called for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities in 2009, and the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011. President Bush himself, standing next to Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad as they announced their agreement, said: “The agreement lays out a framework for the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq.” So the 2011 withdrawal date was set by President Bush, not President Obama.
As to whether our military commanders objected to our withdrawal from Iraq, here’s what happened: While there was no mention from President Bush or Prime Minister Maliki when they announced their agreement of a U.S. troop presence after 2011, Secretary Gates and others discussed the possibility of some forces remaining in Iraq after 2011. And then, during 2011, the Obama administration entered into negotiations with the Iraqi government with the goal of keeping some U.S. troops, in limited roles, in Iraq to assist Iraqi security forces after the 2011 withdrawal date set by President Bush. I and many other members of Congress supported the idea of continuing a smaller, specialized U.S. military assistance force. While there was disagreement in the administration over the size of a residual force, what decided the issue wasn’t how many troops would remain. Rather, it was the Iraqi government’s refusal to agree to legal protections for residual U.S. troops, whatever their number. In the absence of such protections, it was the opinion of our military leaders that no U.S. forces should remain in Iraq, regardless of whether the number was 3,500 or 20,000.
- See more at: http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/speeches/speech/levin-floor-statement-on-the-situation-in-iraq1#sthash.7MkZIChJ.dpuf
That argument ignores some important history. First, it ignores the fact that the 2011 withdrawal date for U.S. forces in Iraqi was not set by President Obama, but by President Bush. In December of 2008, just before he left office, President Bush signed an agreement with the Iraqi government that called for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities in 2009, and the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011. President Bush himself, standing next to Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad as they announced their agreement, said: “The agreement lays out a framework for the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq.” So the 2011 withdrawal date was set by President Bush, not President Obama.
As to whether our military commanders objected to our withdrawal from Iraq, here’s what happened: While there was no mention from President Bush or Prime Minister Maliki when they announced their agreement of a U.S. troop presence after 2011, Secretary Gates and others discussed the possibility of some forces remaining in Iraq after 2011. And then, during 2011, the Obama administration entered into negotiations with the Iraqi government with the goal of keeping some U.S. troops, in limited roles, in Iraq to assist Iraqi security forces after the 2011 withdrawal date set by President Bush. I and many other members of Congress supported the idea of continuing a smaller, specialized U.S. military assistance force. While there was disagreement in the administration over the size of a residual force, what decided the issue wasn’t how many troops would remain. Rather, it was the Iraqi government’s refusal to agree to legal protections for residual U.S. troops, whatever their number. In the absence of such protections, it was the opinion of our military leaders that no U.S. forces should remain in Iraq, regardless of whether the number was 3,500 or 20,000.
- See more at: http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/speeches/speech/levin-floor-statement-on-the-situation-in-iraq1#sthash.7MkZIChJ.dpuf
That argument ignores some important history. First, it ignores the fact that the 2011 withdrawal date for U.S. forces in Iraqi was not set by President Obama, but by President Bush. In December of 2008, just before he left office, President Bush signed an agreement with the Iraqi government that called for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities in 2009, and the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011. President Bush himself, standing next to Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad as they announced their agreement, said: “The agreement lays out a framework for the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq.” So the 2011 withdrawal date was set by President Bush, not President Obama.
As to whether our military commanders objected to our withdrawal from Iraq, here’s what happened: While there was no mention from President Bush or Prime Minister Maliki when they announced their agreement of a U.S. troop presence after 2011, Secretary Gates and others discussed the possibility of some forces remaining in Iraq after 2011. And then, during 2011, the Obama administration entered into negotiations with the Iraqi government with the goal of keeping some U.S. troops, in limited roles, in Iraq to assist Iraqi security forces after the 2011 withdrawal date set by President Bush. I and many other members of Congress supported the idea of continuing a smaller, specialized U.S. military assistance force. While there was disagreement in the administration over the size of a residual force, what decided the issue wasn’t how many troops would remain. Rather, it was the Iraqi government’s refusal to agree to legal protections for residual U.S. troops, whatever their number. In the absence of such protections, it was the opinion of our military leaders that no U.S. forces should remain in Iraq, regardless of whether the number was 3,500 or 20,000.
- See more at: http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/speeches/speech/levin-floor-statement-on-the-situation-in-iraq1#sthash.7MkZIChJ.dpuf


That argument ignores some important history. First, it ignores the fact that the 2011 withdrawal date for U.S. forces in Iraqi was not set by President Obama, but by President Bush. In December of 2008, just before he left office, President Bush signed an agreement with the Iraqi government that called for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities in 2009, and the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011. President Bush himself, standing next to Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad as they announced their agreement, said: “The agreement lays out a framework for the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq.” So the 2011 withdrawal date was set by President Bush, not President Obama.


As to whether our military commanders objected to our withdrawal from Iraq, here’s what happened: While there was no mention from President Bush or Prime Minister Maliki when they announced their agreement of a U.S. troop presence after 2011, Secretary Gates and others discussed the possibility of some forces remaining in Iraq after 2011. And then, during 2011, the Obama administration entered into negotiations with the Iraqi government with the goal of keeping some U.S. troops, in limited roles, in Iraq to assist Iraqi security forces after the 2011 withdrawal date set by President Bush. I and many other members of Congress supported the idea of continuing a smaller, specialized U.S. military assistance force. While there was disagreement in the administration over the size of a residual force, what decided the issue wasn’t how many troops would remain. Rather, it was the Iraqi government’s refusal to agree to legal protections for residual U.S. troops, whatever their number. In the absence of such protections, it was the opinion of our military leaders that no U.S. forces should remain in Iraq, regardless of whether the number was 3,500 or 20,000.

Sure, it might have been helpful if some U.S. troops remained in Iraq. But the U.S. military has a bright red line against letting local law enforcement prosecute their people. The same issue came up in Afghanistan, where U.S. negotiators insisted on a status of forces arrangement that the Afghans agreed to, in the still-unsigned  Bilateral Security Agreement. For McCain and Graham to suggest that Obama is to blame is way off the mark.
That argument ignores some important history. First, it ignores the fact that the 2011 withdrawal date for U.S. forces in Iraqi was not set by President Obama, but by President Bush. In December of 2008, just before he left office, President Bush signed an agreement with the Iraqi government that called for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities in 2009, and the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011. President Bush himself, standing next to Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad as they announced their agreement, said: “The agreement lays out a framework for the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq.” So the 2011 withdrawal date was set by President Bush, not President Obama.
As to whether our military commanders objected to our withdrawal from Iraq, here’s what happened: While there was no mention from President Bush or Prime Minister Maliki when they announced their agreement of a U.S. troop presence after 2011, Secretary Gates and others discussed the possibility of some forces remaining in Iraq after 2011. And then, during 2011, the Obama administration entered into negotiations with the Iraqi government with the goal of keeping some U.S. troops, in limited roles, in Iraq to assist Iraqi security forces after the 2011 withdrawal date set by President Bush. I and many other members of Congress supported the idea of continuing a smaller, specialized U.S. military assistance force. While there was disagreement in the administration over the size of a residual force, what decided the issue wasn’t how many troops would remain. Rather, it was the Iraqi government’s refusal to agree to legal protections for residual U.S. troops, whatever their number. In the absence of such protections, it was the opinion of our military leaders that no U.S. forces should remain in Iraq, regardless of whether the number was 3,500 or 20,000.
- See more at: http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/speeches/speech/levin-floor-statement-on-the-situation-in-iraq1#sthash.7MkZIChJ.dpuf
That argument ignores some important history. First, it ignores the fact that the 2011 withdrawal date for U.S. forces in Iraqi was not set by President Obama, but by President Bush. In December of 2008, just before he left office, President Bush signed an agreement with the Iraqi government that called for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities in 2009, and the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011. President Bush himself, standing next to Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad as they announced their agreement, said: “The agreement lays out a framework for the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq.” So the 2011 withdrawal date was set by President Bush, not President Obama.
As to whether our military commanders objected to our withdrawal from Iraq, here’s what happened: While there was no mention from President Bush or Prime Minister Maliki when they announced their agreement of a U.S. troop presence after 2011, Secretary Gates and others discussed the possibility of some forces remaining in Iraq after 2011. And then, during 2011, the Obama administration entered into negotiations with the Iraqi government with the goal of keeping some U.S. troops, in limited roles, in Iraq to assist Iraqi security forces after the 2011 withdrawal date set by President Bush. I and many other members of Congress supported the idea of continuing a smaller, specialized U.S. military assistance force. While there was disagreement in the administration over the size of a residual force, what decided the issue wasn’t how many troops would remain. Rather, it was the Iraqi government’s refusal to agree to legal protections for residual U.S. troops, whatever their number. In the absence of such protections, it was the opinion of our military leaders that no U.S. forces should remain in Iraq, regardless of whether the number was 3,500 or 20,000.
- See more at: http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/speeches/speech/levin-floor-statement-on-the-situation-in-iraq1#sthash.7MkZIChJ.dpuf

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