takes one to know one

Frank Snepp, a former CIA operative who published information about U.S. activities at the time of the fall of Saigon to the North Vietnamese, notably the agency's failure to try to protect its indigenous agents, says Edward Snowden should accept punishment for his disclosures.

Government prosecutors never accused me of betraying classified secrets. But in 1980, the Supreme Court decided that I had "irreparably harmed" national security by publishing my book without official approval, in violation of CIA nondisclosure agreements. This, the court said, harmed the government's ability to prevent serious leaks.

The ruling left me destitute, stigmatized and gagged for life, required to clear with the CIA all my spy-related writings, including this one, with the threat of jail time if I screw up. The 1st Amendment also took a hit with the rulings in my case. Now, all intelligence alumni, Snowden included, can be severely punished for merely speaking out about their work, regardless of whether what they say contains any classified information.

Yet, for all that I suffered personally, I never ran or tried to hide. And when the time came to face the music, I never bargained for mercy. I simply took my lumps, accepting them as the price we pay in a democracy for the right to speak out.

I agree. Snowden is no Ellsberg.

mutual distrust

There are many explanations for the increased polarization in American politics. I think most are partial, and the outcome is a result of their combined effects. But writers at the ever-valuable Monkey Cage point to a more recent phenomenon -- extremely low trust of government when the opposition party is in power.

Professors Marc Hetherington and Thomas Rudolph cited a 2011 poll that "asked people to place the Republican Party and the Democratic Party on a feeling thermometer that runs from 0 (really hate the group) to 100 (really love the group). The average score Republicans gave the Democratic Party was just 18 degrees, and the average score Democrats gave the Republican Party was the same, 18 degrees. When Jimmy Carter was president, those average scores for the other party tended to be in the mid-40s. Even as recently as Bill Clinton’s presidency, they were always at least solidly in the upper 30s. To understand the depth of the recent upturn in negative feelings, we should recall that the late Clinton-era readings were taken even as one party was impeaching the president of the other party."

Another indication:

It seems an important indication of how politics is today that partisans express more negative feelings toward the other party than they do toward atheists. It is not just lower scores on feeling thermometers, either. Shanto Iyengar and his co-authors find, among other things, that partisans are increasingly uncomfortable with their children marrying people who identify with the other party.

I've argued that another contributing factor to our hyperpartisanship is that each of the past 3 presidents have been viewed as fundamentally illegitimate by a large segment of the opposition party.

Whatever the sources of the anger and mistrust, the result is a toxic and dysfunctional political system.

with a little help from his friends

The recent Washington Post stories [here and here] about misbehaving general and flag officers and "toxic" leaders in the Pentagon, both uniformed and civilian, have been dispiriting.  It's not surprising that powerful people abuse their power, and it's gratifying that some of them get caught and punished. But we expect above average human behavior from our military leaders.

Now it seems that at least one of those toxic leaders, a retired Army Lieutenant General, has found a way to salvage his reputation -- by hiring a company that floods Google with favorable items. Remember that if you ever get in trouble.

bad news about U.S. foreign economic policy

I noted the other day that Congress blocked the administration's effort to let the United States support reform of the International Monetary Fund that an earlier congress authorized. Then last night the president made a tepid defense of his foreign trade proposals, which many Democrats oppose. Today, the Senate Majority Leaders, Harry Reid of Nevada, said he was opposed to the bill authorizing the trade negotiations and said he might not even bring it to a vote. The measure, often called "fast track" because it allows trade agreements to be voted on without congressional amendments or filibusters, is necessary to permit completion of the trade packages for the Pacific region and with the European Union. Not good news.

epic adventures

As a freshman in college, I took a course way outside my comfort zone, an upper level course on Milton taught by a noted Milton scholar. My classmates were mostly English major and graduate students. But I wanted to read Paradise Lost and other poems because I was on an epic binge.

I had read the Iliad and Odyssey in high school English and Vergil's Aeneid in Latin class, and I wanted to continue with the greatest English epic poem. I also liked Milton's politics, especially his defense of freedom of speech and of the press. Not only did we read and discuss most of Milton's works, we also had to memorize long passages of his poetry -- a requirement that, sadly, teachers don't seem to impose any more.

So why do I mention this here? Well, words matter in public policy as well as poetry. And it turns out that Milton coined a great many [or at least was the first to include them in printed works]. While reading a clever British book on the evolution of English words, I see a list of many of the words first used by Milton:

impassive, obtrusive, jubilant, loquacious, unconvincing, Satanic, persona, fragrance, beleaguered, sensuous, undesirable, disregard, damp, criticize, irresponsible, exhilarating, lovelorn, sectarian, unaccountable, incidental, cooking, stunning, terrific, extravagance, enjoyable, unintended, depravity, and silver lining.

Wow! No wonder his 17th century language was clear and understandable. We've adopted his legacy.

maybe U.S. policy in Syria isn't so bad

I haven't heard a good word about America's Syria policy from anybody outside the administration in quite a while, so it's interesting and refreshing to read Zachary Keck's piece in The National Interest.

Keck says:

The most significant way the U.S. has benefited from the Syrian civil war is by seeing its regional and global adversaries undermined by the conflict. Just as the U.S. has been the primary external benefactor of the Syrian civil war, no third party has been a bigger loser in Syria then Iran.

He still argues for U.S. involvement to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, but he thinks analysts have not sufficiently recognized the way the conflict has hurt Iran and its allies, and al Qaeda, and even China.

Meanwhile, note this Reuters report that the congressional intelligence committees have approved a resumption of arms deliveries to the so-called moderates in the Syrian opposition.

Pentagon wish lists

There is a long history of members of Congress trying to get support for higher military spending by asking senior commanders if they have enough to keep America safe and strong.  Since the officers are morally bound to support the president's budget -- since they didn't resign in protest when it was released -- they talk about "increased risk." So the lawmakers changed the question: What would you do with an extra billion or two? To answer that, the services devised their "unfunded priority list."  Several defense secretaries in recent years tried to forbid the military from sending such lists to the Hill, but to no avail.

Now, it turns out, the Obama OMB is formally directing the Pentagon to develop such a list, with the $26 billion cap. They call it an "investment fund." It sounds to me like a way of having a DOD-wide top priority list that could be seen as more credible than individual service wish lists. Let's see how it works out.

long time passing

I like folk music. One of my first record albums was Burl Ives singing "Big Rock Candy Mountain" and other old tunes. In high school, I heard Judy Collins sing at a local Denver coffee house. [Her father hosted a morning radio show that my parents regularly listened to.] In college, I lived across the street from the club where Joan Baez performed in her early years. I even went to the Newport Folk Festival and joined in the singing of "The Times They are a-changing"-- before Dylan went electric.

So I want to reflect on the passing of Pete Seeger, a Harvard drop-out who did good things and gave memorable music to several generations of fans like me. The New York Times has a lengthy obituary. He was naive about the communist party but devoted to the rights of workers. He served in World War II and later wrote some powerful antiwar songs. He sparked the environmental movement that has done much to clean up the Hudson River. He lived a full life of 94 years.

There's a good recent book by John Shaw examining the patriotic music heritage in America by comparing and contrasting two of our iconic songs, Irving Berlin's "God Bless America" and Woody Guthrie's "This land is your land." Sing out!

IMF hostage-taking

Domestic politics has thwarted good foreign policy once again. Despite strong administration pressure to include a provision in the recent omnibus appropriations bill, Congress failed to approve a $63 million shift of funds provided to the International Monetary Fund as part of a restructuring Congress had already approved in 2009.

Why? Some Republicans just don't like the IMF, despite the fact that most of its conditions on assistance to struggling economies come right out of the Chicago school of conservative policies. Other lawmakers don't like the notion of "giving" money to any international institution, again despite the weighted voting that gives the U.S.a veto over IMF actions.

The strongest reason appears to be hostage taking: Republicans wanted something in return for approving something wanted by the administration. According to a revealing article in the Financial Times, the IMF issue was the last one in dispute as the budget negotiators tried to conclude their deal. At first, Republicans wanted restrictive rules to prevent the IRS from tightening regulations on non-profit groups involved in politics. Then they asked for a change in Obamacare to delay the mandate for contraception funding. The administration rejected both proposals, and the IMF transfer was dropped.

Next in line, hostage taking for the debt limit increase...

an earmark by any other name is still good

The Wall Street Journal says that congressional earmarks are back. Of course, budget guru Stan Collender made the same point two weeks ago.

The point is that congressional appropriators, given the chance to do their thing, discovered that they could build successful legislation by sweetening the pot with local projects. Another way of viewing them is a kind of WD-40 for gridlock.

As few people realize, eliminating earmarks didn't save a penny; it just let the executive branch decide where to spend the money. And it deprived congressional leaders of leverage over members who had no stakes in the measures being debated.

measuring presidential success

White House political types are trying to sell a dubious line -- that the president doesn't really need Congress to do great things, and that the media should not judge the Obama administration by how many of its proposals make it into law.

Of course the president needs Congress -- to pass annual appropriations, to deal with the debt ceiling, and to make any changes in the laws [like the Affordable Care Act] that have glitches or anomalies.

And when a president offers a laundry list of ideas in the State of the Union address, he invites a later lookback at how many were approved.

Meanwhile, there is real-time information on how well the president is going in the approval ratings and related polls, some of which date to the 1930s and provide a reliable graph of presidential favor and disfavor. Those numbers also contribute to overall presidential power because other politicians adjust their own behavior, moving closer to popular presidents and away from unpopular ones.

Unlike French presidents, who, pharaoh-like, seem to believe they need a legacy of at least one major building, U.S. presidents should be judged more like doctors -- did they do no harm and save most of their patients?

low, lower, lowest

Nobody likes Congress anymore. Bob Gates called it "truly ugly," despite its strong support for almost everything in his defense budgets. He went on: "Uncivil, incompetent in fulfilling basic constitutional responsibilities (such as timely appropriations), micromanagerial, parochial, hypocritical, egotistical, think-skinned, often  putting self (and reelection) before country...."

The American public has record low approval ratings for Congress. Approval dipped into single digits in November 2013 and has now surged [at least as a percent of a percent] to 13%. [Obama's approval is also low but rebounding, now at 43%.]

Now comes the most discouraging news of all. A new Gallup poll finds record low support for "reelecting your own congressman" regardless of views of Congress as a whole. Only 46% of respondents are willing to do that. It used to be that the public had a low opinion of the institution but support for their own representative. I guess the ebbing tide is sinking all the ships. Maybe this foreshadows another wave election.

playing both sides

Successful American companies tend to think that the Federal Government will honor their achievements and not cause them trouble. Until a dozen or so years ago, Walmart had a 3-person Washington office, and visiting executives had to take cabs to their meetings. Microsoft and Google thought they were above suspicion for the longest time and only in recent years built up DC offices and hired lobbyists.

That was then. Today the Wall Street Journal reports that Google is making a concerted effort to support Republican groups. Officials apparently felt that they had been too close to Democrats and needed to broaden their appeal and their support. That's politics.

Obama, the reluctant warrior

It's no secret that President Obama wants to end U.S. military operations big enough to be called "wars" in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to avoid new ones. In his interviews with David Remnick of The New Yorker, he explains his thinking in more detail.

He denies that he failed in Syria:

"It is very difficult to imagine a scenario in which our involvement in Syria would have led to a better outcome, short of us being willing to undertake an effort in size and scope similar to what we did in Iraq. And when I hear people suggesting that somehow if we had just financed and armed the opposition earlier, that somehow Assad would be gone by now and we’d have a peaceful transition, it’s magical thinking.

“It’s not as if we didn’t discuss this extensively down in the Situation Room. It’s not as if we did not solicit—and continue to solicit—opinions from a wide range of folks. Very early in this process, I actually asked the C.I.A. to analyze examples of America financing and supplying arms to an insurgency in a country that actually worked out well. And they couldn’t come up with much. We have looked at this from every angle. And the truth is that the challenge there has been, and continues to be, that you have an authoritarian, brutal government who is willing to do anything to hang on to power, and you have an opposition that is disorganized, ill-equipped, ill-trained, and is self-divided. All of that is on top of some of the sectarian divisions. . . . And, in that environment, our best chance of seeing a decent outcome at this point is to work the state actors who have invested so much in keeping Assad in power—mainly the Iranians and the Russians—as well as working with those who have been financing the opposition to make sure that they’re not creating the kind of extremist force that we saw emerge out of Afghanistan when we were financing the mujahideen.”

While Obama does not mention the contrasting views of some of his own advisers as well as many in the Congress, I think Syria posed too many dilemmas for U.S. policymakers. Advocates of overthrowing Assad had to rule out American "boots on the ground" and had to pretend that U.S. aid could be channeled only to "moderate" rebels with no risk of weapons or power going to extremists.

There are more comments in "outtakes" from the interviews that Remnick has now posted.

defense contracts and local jobs

For decades, defense contractors -- especially for big ticket items like aircraft --have bragged that their programs create jobs throughout the country. The B-1 bomber had subcontracts in 48 states, the F-22 fighter in 44, the F-35 fighter in 46.  Those facts helped build strong and widespread support for the programs, despite ever-rising costs.

Now a think tank report says that the claims, at least for Lockheed Martin's F-35, are greatly exaggerated.
Instead of the claimed 125,000 jobs, the Center for International Policy says the real figure is only 50-60,000.

The report also says that there are hardly any jobs in many of the states:

...Eleven states have fewer than a dozen F-35-related jobs, a figure so low that it is a serious stretch to count them among the 46 states doing significant work on the program. These states are Iowa, South Dakota, Montana, West Virginia, Delaware, Nebraska, North Dakota, Alaska, Hawaii, Louisiana and Wyoming."

It's always a good idea to take contractor estimates with several grains of salt.

who should fly drones?

Somebody leaked to the press that Congress had secretly passed a provision in the new omnibus appropriations bill that restricts the transfer of armed drone attacks from the CIA to the U.S. military. The Post and Times have slightly different descriptions of the amendment, which was included in a secret annex to the bill. This was done by appropriators, and some authorizers like Sen. John McCain [R-AZ] were upset. Obviously, they didn't know about the change or try to read the secret annex.

Currently both the CIA and the Pentagon have lethal drone operations, but the White House indicated last May 23 that most would be shifted to the military -- a change also favored by the new CIA director, John Brennan.

There are good reasons for and against the change. CIA operations can be kept more secret, there by reducing some of the blowback abroad. The Pentagon has better accountability to Congress and the public, including established procedures to consider moral and legal consequences of drone strikes. I'm undecided on the matter myself, but wanted to draw attention to the fact that Congress does sometime legislate in secret.

Obama, Gates and civil-military relations

Now that I've have time to read the whole of Bob Gates' memoir, Duty, I think some of the earlier reporting was misleading. Oft-quoted was the passage where Gates thinks to himself that Obama didn't believe in his own Afghanistan policy and distrusted his generals. Also in the book are several times when Gates admits that it looked as if the military was "jamming" the President or otherwise trying to force the president to accept their preferred policies. He denies that was the intent, but acknowledges that such an interpretation was possible.

Especially during the Afghanistan policy review in 2009, regional U.S. commanders and some of the JCS made troop requests or other public comments that embarrassed the White House. Gates blames much of this on "the notion that modern military leaders should also be 'strategic communicators.'"

Seemingly caught in the middle, Gates says one of his major tasks was to help manage the civil-military relationship "to ensure that the president listens to professional military advice that he may not want to hear, and that senior officers offer their best and most candid advice and obey loyally, especially when they are overruled."  I think that's the right position for a SecDef and Gates did a reasonable, though not always successful, job of it.

On the other hand, the Obama people -- from Gates and other evidence -- were too ready to distrust the military [as Rumsfeld was in 2001 because the leaders had been chosen by the previous administration] and too slow to develop good working partnerships with them.

honorable "Duty"

Robert Gates' memoir as Secretary of Defense, though tellingly subtitled "Secretary at War," is an excellent book -- honest, clear, revealing, personal yet also analytical, far better than the usual Washington memoir.The best journalistic review I've seen is Fred Kaplan's, which captures many of my own reactions to the 600-page volume.

Gates is far less strident than most of the cherry-picked quotes in news stories. He expresses his anger at some behaviors, especially by members of Congress, but documents the actions that provoked him. Overall, however, he seems to understand the motivations of those who disagreed with him and tries rationally to justify his own positions.

He makes clear why, as I concluded in my own comparative study of earlier Secretaries of Defense, that position is a nearly impossible job. He details with vivid examples the many simultaneous, exhausting duties of a defense secretary -- running two wars, obtaining budgetary support, attending policy meetings, traveling worldwide in diplomatic roles, and leading the large collection of bureaucracies that is the Defense Department.

Yet Gates succeeded better than any of his predecessors by maintaining a close and trusting relationship with two quite different presidents, by working collaboratively with his NSC colleagues, by developing a close professional relationship of trust with the senior military, and by maintaining a good relationship with Congress, despite his disdain of many members.

I scour such books looking for sections I can assign to students so that they can get a first-person picture of the policy process. Gates provides long chapters on the Obama decision to surge troops into Afghanistan, the administration's reaction to the Arab spring and the bombing of Libya, and various other events. He also has well-crafted general observations of how government works and what might make it work better.

Some reviewers seem to feel that, if he was so upset at different times, he should have resigned -- or at least spoken out publicly. I disagree. He acted professionally as I hope any military leader would -- giving his professional advice in private and then loyally supporting presidential decisions. He didn't leak. He held subordinates accountable. He did his duty.

a plea for cyber defense

I have long been concerned that cyber warfare planners are exaggerating the value of offensive operations and under-resourcing efforts to build cyber defenses. P.W. Singer and Allan Friedman have an article in FP that elaborates this point and warns that it's as misleading as the pre-1914 "cult of the offensive" that helped trigger world war I.

The authors say offensive cyber R&D is 2.5 to 4 times as much as R&D on cyber defense. They also note the military cultural bias in favor of offense over defense, despite the strong evidence that this is not the case in cyber war.  I hope their message is heeded.

playing by the rules

The omnibus appropriations bill funding the U.S. government for the rest of fiscal year 2014 is H.R. 3547. The original title and substance of that measure was "A bill to extend Government liability, subject to appropriation, for certain third-party claims arising from commercial space launches." So why is this insurance claims bill the vehicle for the big money bill?

Short answer: because it makes passage easier. Longer answer: because it avoids a filibuster in the Senate and amendments in the House. In other words, it allows the compromise package to avoid delays or dismantlement.

The traditional way to settle differences between chambers is a conference committee. Even there, the way the conferees report their action, often in terms of receding from amendments by one house and so forth, limits what can be done to the resulting package. Another way to resolve differences is legislative ping pong, sending the "papers" on the measure back and forth until both houses pass the same language.

In this case, the House had passed H.R. 3547 on December 2, 2013. Ten days later, the Senate passed the bill with a small amendment increasing the extension of the liability law and sending it back to the House.

When the appropriators reached their package, they chose to attach it as an amendment to H.R. 3547, thereby gaining the protections mentioned earlier. CRS has a good paper explaining some of this arcana. The lesson here is that different rules lead to different outcomes, and good lawmakers know how to play by the rules.

Benghazi report

The Senate Intelligence Committee has issued a bipartisan report on the Benghazi attacks on Americans that puts the Obama Administration in a better light and rejects many of the criticisms by House Republicans. The full 85-page report is here .http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/benghazi2014/benghazi.pdf

failing elites

Martin Wolf of the Financial Times has an excellent piece today warning that western intellectual and political elites have failed to protect the rest of us from serious problems. He cites the failure to foresee and forestall the recent economic collapse, the growth of economic elites detached from individual nations, and the inability of the eurozone to fashion people-helping policies.

I'm especially taken with his comments on his second observed failure:

...in the past three decades we have seen the emergence of a globalised economic and financial elite. Its members have become ever more detached from the countries that produced them. In the process, the glue that binds any democracy – the notion of citizenship – has weakened. The narrow distribution of the gains of economic growth greatly enhances this development. This, then, is ever more a plutocracy. A degree of plutocracy is inevitable in democracies built, as they must be, on market economies. But it is always a matter of degree. If the mass of the people view their economic elite as richly rewarded for mediocre performance and interested only in themselves, yet expecting rescue when things go badly, the bonds snap. We may be just at the beginning of this long-term decay.

Nationalism has some perverse effects, but greedy multinationalism does as well, such as when companies grab tax loopholes without regard to their workers.

Gates the hero

One of Bob Gates' proudest achievements as Secretary of Defense was his successful effort to force the Pentagon to give highest priority to its ongoing wars. Other than the combatant commanders, most of the rest of the military leadership spends its time thinking about future conflicts, and building the capabilities that might be needed.

USA Today is running its own victory lap, bragging about how Gates learned about U.S. military reluctance to buy MRAP vehicles, despite their value in protecting troops from IEDs. The paper retells the story, from Gates' memoir, about how he had to force the military to buy and speed up deliveries of the vehicles.

In other ways, too, Gates redirected Pentagon attention to the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and what was urgently needed. But MRAPS were the best example.

follow the money

Congress is likely to vote on and pass the fiscal year 2014 omnibus appropriations bill later this week. It really is an omnibus, containing all 13 spending bills in a single 1,582-page package. The text is here, but be warned, it's a huge file.

I wanted to draw attention to the contrast between the 164 pages for the defense section, compared to 274 pages for the State Department and foreign assistance. The lawmakers really did weigh in on provisions for dozens of countries and categories of aid.  A 3-page summary is here, but you might be intrigued to scroll through the actual text to see the range of congressional actions. The State/Foreign Ops section K is in bill pages 1132-1406; the defense section C is on pages 200-364.

A point to remember: since the foreign policy authorizing committees have been unable to enact a broad foreign aid authorization bill since 1986, the appropriators have the full power and incentives to include all the micromanaging details in their bill -- while the Pentagon gets authorities and guidance from both the authorizing Armed Services Committees and appropriations.

Is America turning isolationist?

Take a look at this Pew poll. It shows record high responses to the idea that we should mind our own business. But look at the time chart. Previously, those views peaked just after our ignominious withdrawal from Vietnam and from Somalia. Isolationist views dropped just after the 9/11 attacks and have generally risen since.  I think this reflects war weariness and economic insecurity. It may continue, but it could also be reversed -- by threatening conditions overseas or by political leadership for engagement, not just by the president but by the political elites that now find it easier to be populist and isolationist.

December 3, 2013

Public Sees U.S. Power Declining as Support for Global Engagement Slips

Majority Says U.S. Should ‘Mind Its Own Business Internationally’

"seething frustrations and keen observations"

Longtime defense reporter James Kitfield has a revealing and balanced review of Bob Gates' new book in the National Interest. He calls the former defense secretary "a complex man of seething frustrations and keen observations."  I think that helps explain why Gates acted professionally while in office and why his memoir contains valuable lessons now.

Kitfield notes Gates' complaints about White House centralization of policymaking but adds that such behaviors are commonplace, especially in wartime. He cites Gates' dismay over Obama and Clinton comments about political motivations affecting policy views, but also concludes: “Domestic political considerations would therefore be a factor, though I believe never a decisive one, in virtually every major national security problem we tackled.”

Whatever his disappointments over executive branch activities during his tenure, Gates clearly has the lowest regard for the legislative branch -- despite the fact that he maintained among the best relations with Congress of any defense secretary in recent memory.

Gates reserves his most withering criticism for Congress, whose theater of abuse he calls “truly ugly.” His sense of outrage spills off the page in a torrent of disdain. “I saw most of Congress as uncivil, incompetent at fulfilling their basic constitutional responsibilities…micromanagerial, parochial, hypocritical, egotistical, thin-skinned and prone to put self (and re-election) before country,” Gates writes. “I also bristled at what’s become of congressional hearings, where rude, insulting, belittling, bullying and all too often highly personal attacks on witnesses by members of Congress violated nearly every norm of civil behavior.”

I think it's a tribute to his professionalism  that he succeeded with Congress despite these views.

Pentagon Situation Normal, not SNAFU

I'm still waiting for my own copy of Bob Gates' memoir, but I want to share two new reactions that I find quite plausible.

In his review of the book in the Financial Times, reporter Edward Luce notes the difference between what journalists see as newsworthy and what a reviewer sees as significant.

As a journalist, I agree with what has been highlighted about this book in the US media. As a reviewer, considering Duty in its entirety, my take­away is somewhat different from the headlines. The most striking aspect is how gently Gates dishes out his criticisms. Of the book’s more than 600 pages, perhaps only 10 would reflect badly on either president that he served as Pentagon chief.

And Rosa Brooks, law professor who worked at the Pentagon under Gates, sees the civil-military clashes depicted in the memoir as troubling but not surprising. She notes that White House staffs are often very controlling, and politicians naturally consider political considerations in any decision.

Ultimately, the gossipy brouhaha over Gates’s memoir risks obscuring two vital issues, one institutional and the other strategic.

The first is the longer-term prospects for a White House and a Pentagon that can work successfully together, given the vast gulf between the enormous national security complex we’ve built up over the last decade—and the inevitable political imperatives of presidential aides of any party. Most of those I spoke to regard tensions between the White House and Pentagon as fundamentally “more systemic and cultural than personality-driven,” as Janine Davidson, a former Air Force officer, puts it. Davidson, who served under Gates as deputy assistant secretary of defense for plans from 2009 to 2012, notes, “Civilian and military leaders simply speak different languages. They mean different things when they talk of military ‘options,’ or ‘winning’ based on their different backgrounds and the very different pressures they feel.”

...

The second issue obscured by the media furor over Gates memoir is a fundamental debate over the role of the United States in the world, and the role of U.S. military force. This, in the end, is what appears to have motivated the timing and tone of Gates memoir: an urgent conviction that the United States is dangerously over-reliant on force, with a heavily militarized foreign policy increasingly poorly suited to developing creative responses to the complex security challenges the United States now faces.

partisan warfare

Texas professor Sean Theriault makes a useful distinction between political polarization and political warfare. Both are related and both are evident in today's American politics. But what he sees as most destructive to our political system and most harmful to good governance is the take-no-prisoners aspects of political "warfare."

The warfare dimension taps into the strategies that go beyond defeating your opponents to humiliating them, go beyond questioning your opponents’ judgment to questioning their motives, and go beyond fighting the good legislative fight to destroying the institution and the legislative process. Partisan warfare serves electoral goals, not legislative goals.

There are many causes and few cures for the extreme partisanship we have experienced in recent decades and the political gridlock in Congress. But I agree that the worst features are in the efforts to treat every political dispute as armageddon, and to put campaigning above governing.

what does Congress want in Iraq and Syria?

It's becoming clearer to me that Congress is largely responsible for problems in U.S.policy toward both Syria and Iraq. Given legal requirements to notify key lawmakers in advance of certain actions and, in some cases, to obtain approval from key committees, Congress has a delaying and veto power over administration policy.

In Iraq, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been blocking the sale of Apache helicopters to the Malikie government. The committee wants assurances that the aircraft won't be used against Sunni civilians who feel mistreated by the Shiite government. Obviously, selling weapons gives the U.S. some leverage, but it's dubious we can do much to force Maliki to make nice with his domestic opponents.

In Syria, lawmakers wanted contradictory or next-to-impossible conditions: military aid that would go only to Assad opponents who shared U.S. policy goals, including friendliness toward Israel; guarantees that aid wouldn't be transferred or fall into the hands of radical jihadists; no links to Iran or al Qaeda.  Even the limited military assistance was held up for months by objections from the intelligence committees.

Congress has the power of the purse to impose conditions and delays, but lawmakers need to understand that some of their colleagues are responsible for many of the problems they attribute to the administration.

who lost Fallujah?

It's discouraging that jihadist forces have captured Fallujah, the Iraqi city that was the scene of such bitter fighting and U.S. casualties a decade ago. It's also discouraging that U.S. politicians are using this development to try to score domestic political points.

Senators McCain and Graham claim that President Obama failed to secure a continuing U.S. troop presence in Iraq that somehow could have prevented the fall of Fallujah.

I agree instead with the fact-based rebuttal provided by Senator Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee:

That argument ignores some important history. First, it ignores the fact that the 2011 withdrawal date for U.S. forces in Iraqi was not set by President Obama, but by President Bush. In December of 2008, just before he left office, President Bush signed an agreement with the Iraqi government that called for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities in 2009, and the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011. President Bush himself, standing next to Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad as they announced their agreement, said: “The agreement lays out a framework for the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq.” So the 2011 withdrawal date was set by President Bush, not President Obama.
As to whether our military commanders objected to our withdrawal from Iraq, here’s what happened: While there was no mention from President Bush or Prime Minister Maliki when they announced their agreement of a U.S. troop presence after 2011, Secretary Gates and others discussed the possibility of some forces remaining in Iraq after 2011. And then, during 2011, the Obama administration entered into negotiations with the Iraqi government with the goal of keeping some U.S. troops, in limited roles, in Iraq to assist Iraqi security forces after the 2011 withdrawal date set by President Bush. I and many other members of Congress supported the idea of continuing a smaller, specialized U.S. military assistance force. While there was disagreement in the administration over the size of a residual force, what decided the issue wasn’t how many troops would remain. Rather, it was the Iraqi government’s refusal to agree to legal protections for residual U.S. troops, whatever their number. In the absence of such protections, it was the opinion of our military leaders that no U.S. forces should remain in Iraq, regardless of whether the number was 3,500 or 20,000.
- See more at: http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/speeches/speech/levin-floor-statement-on-the-situation-in-iraq1#sthash.7MkZIChJ.dpuf

That argument ignores some important history. First, it ignores the fact that the 2011 withdrawal date for U.S. forces in Iraqi was not set by President Obama, but by President Bush. In December of 2008, just before he left office, President Bush signed an agreement with the Iraqi government that called for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities in 2009, and the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011. President Bush himself, standing next to Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad as they announced their agreement, said: “The agreement lays out a framework for the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq.” So the 2011 withdrawal date was set by President Bush, not President Obama.
As to whether our military commanders objected to our withdrawal from Iraq, here’s what happened: While there was no mention from President Bush or Prime Minister Maliki when they announced their agreement of a U.S. troop presence after 2011, Secretary Gates and others discussed the possibility of some forces remaining in Iraq after 2011. And then, during 2011, the Obama administration entered into negotiations with the Iraqi government with the goal of keeping some U.S. troops, in limited roles, in Iraq to assist Iraqi security forces after the 2011 withdrawal date set by President Bush. I and many other members of Congress supported the idea of continuing a smaller, specialized U.S. military assistance force. While there was disagreement in the administration over the size of a residual force, what decided the issue wasn’t how many troops would remain. Rather, it was the Iraqi government’s refusal to agree to legal protections for residual U.S. troops, whatever their number. In the absence of such protections, it was the opinion of our military leaders that no U.S. forces should remain in Iraq, regardless of whether the number was 3,500 or 20,000.
- See more at: http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/speeches/speech/levin-floor-statement-on-the-situation-in-iraq1#sthash.7MkZIChJ.dpuf

That argument ignores some important history. First, it ignores the fact that the 2011 withdrawal date for U.S. forces in Iraqi was not set by President Obama, but by President Bush. In December of 2008, just before he left office, President Bush signed an agreement with the Iraqi government that called for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities in 2009, and the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011. President Bush himself, standing next to Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad as they announced their agreement, said: “The agreement lays out a framework for the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq.” So the 2011 withdrawal date was set by President Bush, not President Obama.
As to whether our military commanders objected to our withdrawal from Iraq, here’s what happened: While there was no mention from President Bush or Prime Minister Maliki when they announced their agreement of a U.S. troop presence after 2011, Secretary Gates and others discussed the possibility of some forces remaining in Iraq after 2011. And then, during 2011, the Obama administration entered into negotiations with the Iraqi government with the goal of keeping some U.S. troops, in limited roles, in Iraq to assist Iraqi security forces after the 2011 withdrawal date set by President Bush. I and many other members of Congress supported the idea of continuing a smaller, specialized U.S. military assistance force. While there was disagreement in the administration over the size of a residual force, what decided the issue wasn’t how many troops would remain. Rather, it was the Iraqi government’s refusal to agree to legal protections for residual U.S. troops, whatever their number. In the absence of such protections, it was the opinion of our military leaders that no U.S. forces should remain in Iraq, regardless of whether the number was 3,500 or 20,000.
- See more at: http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/speeches/speech/levin-floor-statement-on-the-situation-in-iraq1#sthash.7MkZIChJ.dpuf

That argument ignores some important history. First, it ignores the fact that the 2011 withdrawal date for U.S. forces in Iraqi was not set by President Obama, but by President Bush. In December of 2008, just before he left office, President Bush signed an agreement with the Iraqi government that called for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities in 2009, and the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011. President Bush himself, standing next to Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad as they announced their agreement, said: “The agreement lays out a framework for the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq.” So the 2011 withdrawal date was set by President Bush, not President Obama.
As to whether our military commanders objected to our withdrawal from Iraq, here’s what happened: While there was no mention from President Bush or Prime Minister Maliki when they announced their agreement of a U.S. troop presence after 2011, Secretary Gates and others discussed the possibility of some forces remaining in Iraq after 2011. And then, during 2011, the Obama administration entered into negotiations with the Iraqi government with the goal of keeping some U.S. troops, in limited roles, in Iraq to assist Iraqi security forces after the 2011 withdrawal date set by President Bush. I and many other members of Congress supported the idea of continuing a smaller, specialized U.S. military assistance force. While there was disagreement in the administration over the size of a residual force, what decided the issue wasn’t how many troops would remain. Rather, it was the Iraqi government’s refusal to agree to legal protections for residual U.S. troops, whatever their number. In the absence of such protections, it was the opinion of our military leaders that no U.S. forces should remain in Iraq, regardless of whether the number was 3,500 or 20,000.
- See more at: http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/speeches/speech/levin-floor-statement-on-the-situation-in-iraq1#sthash.7MkZIChJ.dpuf

That argument ignores some important history. First, it ignores the fact that the 2011 withdrawal date for U.S. forces in Iraqi was not set by President Obama, but by President Bush. In December of 2008, just before he left office, President Bush signed an agreement with the Iraqi government that called for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities in 2009, and the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011. President Bush himself, standing next to Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad as they announced their agreement, said: “The agreement lays out a framework for the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq.” So the 2011 withdrawal date was set by President Bush, not President Obama.

As to whether our military commanders objected to our withdrawal from Iraq, here’s what happened: While there was no mention from President Bush or Prime Minister Maliki when they announced their agreement of a U.S. troop presence after 2011, Secretary Gates and others discussed the possibility of some forces remaining in Iraq after 2011. And then, during 2011, the Obama administration entered into negotiations with the Iraqi government with the goal of keeping some U.S. troops, in limited roles, in Iraq to assist Iraqi security forces after the 2011 withdrawal date set by President Bush. I and many other members of Congress supported the idea of continuing a smaller, specialized U.S. military assistance force. While there was disagreement in the administration over the size of a residual force, what decided the issue wasn’t how many troops would remain. Rather, it was the Iraqi government’s refusal to agree to legal protections for residual U.S. troops, whatever their number. In the absence of such protections, it was the opinion of our military leaders that no U.S. forces should remain in Iraq, regardless of whether the number was 3,500 or 20,000.

Sure, it might have been helpful if some U.S. troops remained in Iraq. But the U.S. military has a bright red line against letting local law enforcement prosecute their people. The same issue came up in Afghanistan, where U.S. negotiators insisted on a status of forces arrangement that the Afghans agreed to, in the still-unsigned  Bilateral Security Agreement. For McCain and Graham to suggest that Obama is to blame is way off the mark.

That argument ignores some important history. First, it ignores the fact that the 2011 withdrawal date for U.S. forces in Iraqi was not set by President Obama, but by President Bush. In December of 2008, just before he left office, President Bush signed an agreement with the Iraqi government that called for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities in 2009, and the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011. President Bush himself, standing next to Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad as they announced their agreement, said: “The agreement lays out a framework for the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq.” So the 2011 withdrawal date was set by President Bush, not President Obama.
As to whether our military commanders objected to our withdrawal from Iraq, here’s what happened: While there was no mention from President Bush or Prime Minister Maliki when they announced their agreement of a U.S. troop presence after 2011, Secretary Gates and others discussed the possibility of some forces remaining in Iraq after 2011. And then, during 2011, the Obama administration entered into negotiations with the Iraqi government with the goal of keeping some U.S. troops, in limited roles, in Iraq to assist Iraqi security forces after the 2011 withdrawal date set by President Bush. I and many other members of Congress supported the idea of continuing a smaller, specialized U.S. military assistance force. While there was disagreement in the administration over the size of a residual force, what decided the issue wasn’t how many troops would remain. Rather, it was the Iraqi government’s refusal to agree to legal protections for residual U.S. troops, whatever their number. In the absence of such protections, it was the opinion of our military leaders that no U.S. forces should remain in Iraq, regardless of whether the number was 3,500 or 20,000.
- See more at: http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/speeches/speech/levin-floor-statement-on-the-situation-in-iraq1#sthash.7MkZIChJ.dpuf

That argument ignores some important history. First, it ignores the fact that the 2011 withdrawal date for U.S. forces in Iraqi was not set by President Obama, but by President Bush. In December of 2008, just before he left office, President Bush signed an agreement with the Iraqi government that called for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities in 2009, and the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011. President Bush himself, standing next to Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad as they announced their agreement, said: “The agreement lays out a framework for the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq.” So the 2011 withdrawal date was set by President Bush, not President Obama.
As to whether our military commanders objected to our withdrawal from Iraq, here’s what happened: While there was no mention from President Bush or Prime Minister Maliki when they announced their agreement of a U.S. troop presence after 2011, Secretary Gates and others discussed the possibility of some forces remaining in Iraq after 2011. And then, during 2011, the Obama administration entered into negotiations with the Iraqi government with the goal of keeping some U.S. troops, in limited roles, in Iraq to assist Iraqi security forces after the 2011 withdrawal date set by President Bush. I and many other members of Congress supported the idea of continuing a smaller, specialized U.S. military assistance force. While there was disagreement in the administration over the size of a residual force, what decided the issue wasn’t how many troops would remain. Rather, it was the Iraqi government’s refusal to agree to legal protections for residual U.S. troops, whatever their number. In the absence of such protections, it was the opinion of our military leaders that no U.S. forces should remain in Iraq, regardless of whether the number was 3,500 or 20,000.
- See more at: http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/speeches/speech/levin-floor-statement-on-the-situation-in-iraq1#sthash.7MkZIChJ.dpuf

Gates unhinged?

I'm still waiting for my copy of Bob Gates' latest memoir, but I want to react to the initial news coverage. A few reporters who have seen copies emphasize the former defense secretary's criticism of Obama, Biden, and the Congress, but some also mention somewhat contradictory statements.. That suggests to me that the book is a historically useful description of how Gates felt and acted at different times in his long tenure as SecDef. Summary judgments are more quotable, but I'm looking for more details about specific decisions and incidents.

Pending further reading, I still believe that Gates was our most successful Pentagon leader. He maintained the support of two quite different presidents, and despite his evident disagreements on some policies. He maintained strong support in Congress, despite his now revealed contempt for many lawmakers. And he worked well with most of his high-ranking colleagues, especially two secretaries of state.

Further proof of his professionalism is in the fact that his anger and disagreements are only now coming to light. He wasn't a leaking backstabber while in office, as so many officials have been over the decades. While the Obama administration may be embarrassed and upset by some of his statements now, they should be relieved that he didn't complain open earlier.

One of the most interesting comments I've read this week compares Gates' 1996 memoir with excerpts from his latest book. The then and now quotes seem to reflect how Washington has changed, for the worse, in the intervening years. Gates seems to be reflecting the new anger and disgust over politics.

just punishment for Snowden

Maybe I spent too many years in government and had access to too many useful intelligence products, but I've been disturbed by the overreaction of outrage, especially in the media, over the Snowden leaks. The New York Times editorial calling for clemency reflects its interest as a newspaper but falls short in considering the consequences for U.S. security of such an aciton. I'm ready to admit that NSA has done too much because it could, without more carefully decided what it should. But I also agree with John McLaughlin that its work is valuable in keeping America safe and we would punish NSA at our peril.

I grew up thinking Daniel Ellsberg was a hero for leaking the Pentagon Papers. Snowden is no Ellsberg and should be punished, not venerated for what he has done.  Fred Kaplan has written an excellent piece that captures my own views and distinguishes Ellsberg from Snowden very effectively. He also details the many ways in which Snowden betrayed his oath and his colleagues and his purported principles.

As Kaplan notes,

It is true that Snowden’s revelations about the National Security Agency’s surveillance of American citizens—far vaster than any outsider had suspected, in some cases vaster than the agency’s overseers on the secret FISA court had permitted—have triggered a valuable debate, leading possibly to much-needed reforms.

 If that were all that Snowden had done, if his stolen trove of beyond-top-secret documents had dealt only with the NSA’s domestic surveillance, then some form of leniency might be worth discussing.

But Snowden did much more than that. The documents that he gave the Washington Post’s Barton Gellman and the Guardian’s Glenn Greenwald have, so far, furnished stories about the NSA’s interception of email traffic, mobile phone calls, and radio transmissions of Taliban fighters in Pakistan’s northwest territories; about an operation to gauge the loyalties of CIA recruits in Pakistan; about NSA email intercepts to assist intelligence assessments of what’s going on inside Iran; about NSA surveillance of cellphone calls “worldwide,” an effort that (in the Post’s words) “allows it to look for unknown associates of known intelligence targets by tracking people whose movements intersect.” In his first interview with the South China Morning Post, Snowden revealed that the NSA routinely hacks into hundreds of computers in China and Hong Kong.

Those disclosures of sources and methods harm U.S. security and are not justifiable.

         

the compromised Constitution

If you visit the National Archives in Washington, you can see the signed copy of the Constitution, on display in a dimly lighted, reverential room. The words are inscribed on parchment, in an elegant calligraphy, as formal documents were done in the 18th century. Too bad they don't have a cut-and-paste version showing the many changes made during consideration by the convention in Philadelphia in 1787.

Too few people realize that the Constitution is a compromise agreement. They treat it as carved in stone as if dictated from on high, rather than as a temporary deal, balancing fears and hopes of the framers. Some conservative activists seem to believe that the framework was perfect and immutable, that it should never be changed or even interpreted differently from 18th century thinking and practice.

I've been reading a valuable book explaining the back-and-forth debate during the Philadelphia convention. Professor David Robertson makes th same argument I have made for years about how the framers acted like legislators, taking votes and accepting the outcomes, making deals that sometimes went against their principles or best interests. The grand bargain, of course, was to allow slavery in return for a stronger central government. It took a civil war to purge that action.

What struck me in Robertson's book was how often the delegates openly admitted that they were compromising for the greater good of reaching an agreement most could live with. They didn't cut a deal and pretend that their views prevailed; they argued for compromises and offered concessions -- though the deliberations were kept secret for half a century.

To compromise is not to surrender or capitulate. In politics, especially lawmaking, compromise is essential, even quintessential. But what seems to distinguish 1787 from Congress in 2013 is that lawmakers today aren't seeking deals; they're seeking victories or at least political point scoring.  When people of good will share the desire to reach an agreement, they can usually find a way. Unfortunately, too few are willing nowadays to do the hard work necessary to reach compromise agreements on big issues.

a deeper understanding of war

Years ago, I studied under Sir Michael Howard, eminent British historian and military analyst.  When I read his stunning review of a new book by a young British army officer, Emile Simpson, I knew I should read it.

Howard said:

"A work of such importance that it should be compulsory reading at every level in the military; from the most recently enlisted cadet to the Chief of the Defence Staff and, even more important, the members of the National Security Council . . . It is impossible to summarize Emile Simpson's ideas without distorting them. His own style is so muscular and aphoristic that he can concentrate complex arguments into memorable sentences that will have a life of their own. His familiarity with the work of Aristotle and the history of the English Reformation enables him to explain the requirements of a strategic narrative as effectively as his experiences in Afghanistan illuminate his understanding of the relationship between operational requirements and political objectives. In short (and here I shall really go overboard) --deserves to be seen as a coda to Clausewitz's On War. But it has the advantage of being considerably shorter."

Another British military historian, Max Hastings, had a similar appraisal:

"One of the most important assertions in this fascinating book is that the outcome of wars is now less subject to assessment by body counts than to the verdict of civilian outsiders, who make judgments with scant heed to pure military logic. ... This is the first book by an immensely intelligent and interesting young man, from whom much will be heard. He lays down principles of policy-making and war fighting for instance, the key in counter-insurgency is to match actions and words so as to influence target audiences to subscribe to a given narrative with a wisdom lacking in most contemporary foreign offices. ... Ministers would do well to read Simpson's fascinating and provocative study before they launch their next lunge into the unknown. They might then better understand how elusive in modern conflict are the concepts of winning and losing."

I'm still wrestling with the book. It's short but dense. Simpson has powerful insights that force the reader to pause and think -- and usually understand and agree. He builds on the deeper meanings of Clausewitz and offers a 21st century way of looking at war as organized violence used in a political context much more complex than two sides or two armies. He notes that modern warfare is usually asymmetric, like a trial where each side is its own judge. He drives home that point that contemporary conflicts have multiple audiences whose judgments affect the ultimate outcome, far beyond the clashing armed forces.

I may return with further comments, but wanted to urge wide readership of this powerful volume.

watch list

The Council on Foreign Relations does an annual survey of its members to see what they think are the biggest problems and threats. Here's the latest report.

Among its findings:

The top preventive priorities for 2014 include spillover from Syria’s civil war and violence in Afghanistan as coalition forces draw down. The survey also identifies continued concerns about terror attacks or cyberattacks on the United States, military strikes against Iran, and internal instability in Pakistan.

Compared to last year’s survey, four potential crises were upgraded to a higher priority status:

- a strengthening of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
- a severe North Korean crisis
- civil war in Iraq due to rising Sunni-Shia violence
- growing political instability and civil violence in Jordan

Additionally in 2014, potential crises related to Myanmar, Bangladesh, Venezuela, and the Sino-Indian border dispute were added to the priority list.

I don't envy the officials who have to deal with all of there.

endangered species?

A Pew poll reports that nearly half the Americans who call themselves Republicans don't believe in evolution.

What does that say about natural selection and the future of the GOP?

grim assessments

Let's start the year with some pessimistic forecasts from the U.S. intelligence community:

1, Afghanistan is likely to fracture and the Kabul government grow increasingly irrelevant even with continued U.S. aid and a small U.S. troop presence.

As the Washington Post reports:

A new American intelligence assessment on the Afghan war predicts that the gains the United States and its allies have made during the past three years are likely to have been significantly eroded by 2017, even if Washington leaves behind a few thousand troops and continues bankrolling the impoverished nation, according to officials familiar with the report.

2. Assad will likely maintain power in Syria, though in a smaller rump state, while a vicious civil war rages.

As the Wall Street Journal reports: 

In many ways, Syria as it was known before simply doesn't exist any longer, U.S. officials say. Its place has been taken by a shattered state riven into sectarian enclaves, radicalized by war and positioned to send worrisome ripples out across the Middle East for years to come, say current and former officials.

 In fact, U.S. officials think the chances of steering the outcome have shrunk dramatically. The intelligence assessments that once showed Mr. Assad on the verge of defeat now say he could remain in power for the foreseeable future in key parts of the country bordering Lebanon and the Mediterranean coast. The U.S. doesn't think he will be able to retake the whole country again, U.S. intelligence agencies believe. Areas outside his control are fracturing into warring enclaves along ethnic and sectarian lines, abutting a new al Qaeda-affiliated haven that sweeps from Syria into Iraq.

 The civil war could last another decade or more....

I don't have any bright ideas about how to forestall these discouraging developments, and I don't think our policymakers do either.