the American way with plagues

 One reason for historians to revisit topics already covered by others is that later generations have new questions and new perspectives about the subject matter. Robert P. Watson, writing about the yellow fever epidemic that struck Philadelphia in 1793, tells a story we can resonate with because of our own experiences with Covid-19.

His book, America's First Plague: The Deadly 1793 Epidemic that crippled a young nation,begins with the irony that one of the most likely vectors was a British ship Hankey that was sent to found a colony of free blacks and whites off the coast of Guinea but was driven away, with sick and dying passengers, to the Caribbean and Philadelphia. The venture was funded by British abolitionists.

The strange disease was first noticed at the Philadelphia wharf, where the Hankey and other ships from yellow fever hotspots in the Caribbean had docked. Although Philadelphia, then the capital of the new country, was the leading site for medical and scientific research, doctors were puzzled by the illness and unable to agree on a proper treatment.

Watson highlights the bitter disagreements between Benjamin Rush,the most prominent American physician of the age, and some other local doctors. Rush believed that most epidemics were caused by miasmas, bad air, and were best treated by bloodletting and purgatives. Some of the other doctors favored fluids and rest. Only in the late 19th century did doctors conclude that yellow fever was caused by mosquitoes.

After about ten weeks of high casualties, the first frost led to a quick dropoff of the disease. During and after the worst period, the Philadelphia media clashed with political messages. Jeffersonian Republicans like Rush opposed quarantines and blamed the Federalists for mishandling the plague. Federalist politicians and doctors countered that Rush and the Republicans had made things worse.

Other American cities banned entry of people and ships from Philadelphia or imposed quarantines of new arrivals.

The U.S. Government collapsed. About half the people of Philadelphia left the city during late August and September. President George Washington had long planned to go to Mount Vernon in mid-September, but most of his cabinet and other government employees were already leaving on their own. He finally returned and convened a cabinet meeting in early November and decided Congress could return as scheduled in December.

A happier story is about Philadelphians, who already had a system of almshouses and care for the poor and sick as part of their Quaker tradition. A large suburban house was seized and turned into a hospital for fever victims; doctors and caregivers were recruited and paid; and major improvements in hygiene undertaken. While the news media maintained their partisan passions, they also gave valuable and timely information during the crisis.

This was the first time, but not the last, that Americans grew scared and angry about a medical emergency, vollied political points as they tried to figure out what to do, and learned how better to prepare for future problems. Read the book.