Short version — “deficit-neutral reserve funds” are completely inconsequential amendments offered as a way to discuss budget-irrelevant topics without violating budget reconciliation rules around what you can and can’t include in a budget resolution.In other words, to be in proper form for consideration, amendments to the budget resolution have to mention money [a reserve fund] and not increase the deficit. Even so, the budget measure itself can never become law: it's a "concurrent resolution" that only reflects the judgment of Congress and is never sent to the President for signature into law. Therefore, all of those amendments supposedly making judgments on what should be laws were really just window dressing. They also will serve [misleadingly] as examples in television ads of how Senators stand on hot-button issues.
Monday, March 25, 2013
for the deficit-neutral reserve fund near you
The ever-helpful Wonkblog at the Washington Post explains why most of the 500 or so amendments proposed to the budget resolution had the same, unusual wording related to a "deficit-neutral reserve fund." The answer:
Tuesday, March 19, 2013
A good idea, parsed skeptically
I'm one of the people who, at various times and places, has called for what's labeled Unified National Security Budgeting. Three noted analysts at the Congressional Research Service have just done a paper exploring what that idea might mean in practice. They are skeptical of the idea, in part because it could mean so many different things and could be done in many different ways. I still like the idea but welcome the analysis showing the variety of approaches that fall under the umbrella.
For example, the concept could mean a single national security budget; or mission-based budgeting; or budget displays that cut across several agencies. Each has its presumed benefits and limitations. One of the most important but rarely considered consequence of any change in this direction is how it fits with congressional committees and processes.
I'll admit that many of my friends who endorse this idea do it because they think it would lead to shifts in funds from Defense to State. I'd like to see more of that, too, but I doubt that a unified budget would make much difference. When studying U.S. conventional strategy in Europe in the 1970s, I was appalled to learn that both the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army assumed that their service needed forces to destroy all Soviet tanks, that there was no reason to assume that airpower and ground power could each contribute to the fight. Today, both Defense and State have large foreign military aid programs that might be more efficient if they were evaluated and funded side by side rather than in different bills.
Some advocates of the concept believe that lumping State spending with Defense would protect the smaller department from knee-jerk cuts. That would be nice, too, but you can't really hide international affairs spending from its critics.
What for sure would improve national security policy making is for there to be stronger links between the NSC and OMB. Policy choices should include considerations of cost, and cost alternatives.
For example, the concept could mean a single national security budget; or mission-based budgeting; or budget displays that cut across several agencies. Each has its presumed benefits and limitations. One of the most important but rarely considered consequence of any change in this direction is how it fits with congressional committees and processes.
I'll admit that many of my friends who endorse this idea do it because they think it would lead to shifts in funds from Defense to State. I'd like to see more of that, too, but I doubt that a unified budget would make much difference. When studying U.S. conventional strategy in Europe in the 1970s, I was appalled to learn that both the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army assumed that their service needed forces to destroy all Soviet tanks, that there was no reason to assume that airpower and ground power could each contribute to the fight. Today, both Defense and State have large foreign military aid programs that might be more efficient if they were evaluated and funded side by side rather than in different bills.
Some advocates of the concept believe that lumping State spending with Defense would protect the smaller department from knee-jerk cuts. That would be nice, too, but you can't really hide international affairs spending from its critics.
What for sure would improve national security policy making is for there to be stronger links between the NSC and OMB. Policy choices should include considerations of cost, and cost alternatives.
New revelations on Iraq surge
Michael Gordon of the NYTimes has an article on FP quoting from a transcript of a high level meeting in NSA Steve Hadley's
office on a "Saturday in November" 2006, presumably the 11th, the day
after a Bush decision to conduct a review of US Iraq policy and 3 days
after Hadley's memo on the deteriorating situation there.
What Gordon thinks is important is that Secretary Rice opposed a surge and made the case for a more limited strategy. He fails to mention how widespread such feelings were, including among the U.S. military.
What I think is important is different:
-- The only attendees mentioned were Sec. Rice, her advisor Phil Zelikow, Cheney's advisor John Hannah, and NSC staff. No military. No DOD civilians.
-- A transcript was made. From a taping system? Detailed notes by someone? Why? How often was this done?
-- Peter Feaver, then on the NSC staff, specifically cites Karl Rove as saying public opinion would support a stronger military approach. This comes close to violating the taboo on mentioning domestic political considerations in WH foreign policy discussions.
What Gordon thinks is important is that Secretary Rice opposed a surge and made the case for a more limited strategy. He fails to mention how widespread such feelings were, including among the U.S. military.
What I think is important is different:
-- The only attendees mentioned were Sec. Rice, her advisor Phil Zelikow, Cheney's advisor John Hannah, and NSC staff. No military. No DOD civilians.
-- A transcript was made. From a taping system? Detailed notes by someone? Why? How often was this done?
-- Peter Feaver, then on the NSC staff, specifically cites Karl Rove as saying public opinion would support a stronger military approach. This comes close to violating the taboo on mentioning domestic political considerations in WH foreign policy discussions.
Monday, March 18, 2013
Levin endorses "Title 60" idea
Senator Carl Levin [D-MI], chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, today endorsed "institutionalizing" congressional oversight of Pentagon-run operations such as lethal drone and offensive cyber attacks. In response to a question I asked at an on-the-record session at the Council on Foreign Relations, Levin expressed satisfaction with the current level of information provided to his committee but welcomed the idea of a formal process in law. I have long favored this kind of "Title 60" oversight.
Iraq in the rear-view mirror
The American public has mixed views on the Iraq war. Just in time for the tenth anniversary of the U.S. invasion, Gallup has a poll that finds 53% of the respondents calling America's action a mistake, compared to 42% saying ti was not a mistake. That's certainly the conventional wisdom is Washington, among the punditocracy.
What's interesting to me, however, is that the numbers have changed significantly since 2008, when 63% called the war a mistake and only 36% disagreed.
Majority opinion turned against the war in 2005, never to recover. The surge in US troops and decrease in violence connected with it and the "Anbar awakening" in early 2007 slowed the increase of criticism, but the 2008 campaigns boosted negative feelings.
My own view: lacking any inside knowledge, I felt persuaded that the war was a risk worth taking because of the potential threat posed by Saddam Hussein. I also believed that the congressional authorization of the war made it legitimate and appropriate. I also knew Pentagon & State people planning for the occupation and governmental reconstitution and thought they had good ideas.
Regrettably, those people were not heeded or resourced adequately when the war broke out. The "stuff" that happened was Rumsfeld's fault, and General Franks' refusal to plan for "Phase IV" was a supreme dereliction of duty. These avoidable errors turned a risky operation into a tragedy.
What's interesting to me, however, is that the numbers have changed significantly since 2008, when 63% called the war a mistake and only 36% disagreed.
Majority opinion turned against the war in 2005, never to recover. The surge in US troops and decrease in violence connected with it and the "Anbar awakening" in early 2007 slowed the increase of criticism, but the 2008 campaigns boosted negative feelings.
My own view: lacking any inside knowledge, I felt persuaded that the war was a risk worth taking because of the potential threat posed by Saddam Hussein. I also believed that the congressional authorization of the war made it legitimate and appropriate. I also knew Pentagon & State people planning for the occupation and governmental reconstitution and thought they had good ideas.
Regrettably, those people were not heeded or resourced adequately when the war broke out. The "stuff" that happened was Rumsfeld's fault, and General Franks' refusal to plan for "Phase IV" was a supreme dereliction of duty. These avoidable errors turned a risky operation into a tragedy.
What happened in Cyrpus?
I read the Financial Times because it has news I can't get from other eminent publications. Today, while others are reporting the EU-IMF proposed bailout of Cypriot banks, only the FT has the insider story. It seems as if the Cypriots made a key concession, the Germans demanded more, and everybody else piled on.
Is this a Creditanstalt moment? Neil Irwin of the Washington Post worries that the unusual features of the deal, especially penalizing lower income depositors who thought their savings were insured, could set off a deeper and broader economic crisis in Europe.
I can't judge the financial aspects of the deal, but I worry when big countries, on behalf of their big bankers, force weaker democratic governments to impose austerity on their citizens. That could spark the flames of fanatical nationalism and anti-democratic movements.
The road signs may say "recovery around the corner," but the path is along a high cliff with no guardrails.
Is this a Creditanstalt moment? Neil Irwin of the Washington Post worries that the unusual features of the deal, especially penalizing lower income depositors who thought their savings were insured, could set off a deeper and broader economic crisis in Europe.
I can't judge the financial aspects of the deal, but I worry when big countries, on behalf of their big bankers, force weaker democratic governments to impose austerity on their citizens. That could spark the flames of fanatical nationalism and anti-democratic movements.
The road signs may say "recovery around the corner," but the path is along a high cliff with no guardrails.
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