In the final days before classes begin again, I've had time to read several new books. One of the most exciting has been Fred Kaplan's The Insurgents.
It's a riveting story of how an idea --
counterinsurgency -- was grasped by a few far-sighted Army officers and
then turned into military doctrine and operational practice in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Kaplan's heroes -- Gen. David Petraeus at the center, but
many mentors and acolytes as well -- are labeled "insurgents" because
they challenged the Army's post-Vietnam conventional wisdom that
irregular, asymmetric, "low intensity" conflicts would not and should
not be fought. They won acceptance of their ideas after several years of
unsuccessful combat in Afghanistan and Iraq because the old doctrine of
just killing the enemy had failed. Regrettably, though the new approach
was tried in both places, it was not matched by needed changes by the
host governments.
Kaplan provides fascinating details of how the
insurgents met each other, collaborated openly or secretly in developing
ideas and policy recommendations, and ultimately won top level support
to put their ideas into practice. For Washington insiders, it's a story
of creative networking, how captains and majors made the contacts and
got the jobs that led to influence and power years later. For them, whom
they knew mattered at least as much as what they knew.
Unlike
the typical journalist's book set in Washington and centered on the
White House, this covers both Washington and Baghdad and Kabul, and
tells the stories of the men and women who fought the wars and tried to
learn useful lessons from the experience. It's not about national
politics but about institutional change in one of our oldest
institutions, the U.S. Army.
Thursday, January 24, 2013
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