Friday, September 24, 2010
bureaucratic politics in China
Foreign policy officials and commentators all too often treat other governments as monolithic: "London believes," "India feels." In fact, even non-democratic regimes face internal disagreements and pressures from stakeholders with different interests and perspectives. Now the Washington Post is telling us the same is true in China. Different ministries are jockeying for control over aspects of Chinese foreign policy -- just as in the United States the White House, Pentagon, State Department,and Treasury are often not on the same page.
Thursday, September 23, 2010
don't take The Pledge
The House Republican leadership has released a document setting forth their goals and plans if they regain the majority in this year's elections. It's full of hot button phrases ["job-killing tax hikes" "the red tape factory in Washington"] and hard-to-disagree-with statements. [Does anyone want to let terrorists come to America?]
I was struck by what it says regarding national security and congressional reform.
The Republican leaders pledge to "provide the resources,authority, and support our deployed military requires, fully fund missile defense, and enforce sanctions against Iran." I shouldn't be surprised, but missile defense is already getting $10 billion per year with little yet to show for it. They also pledge to freeze hiring and cap spending at 2008 levels for non-security discretionary accounts. What's that? It's everything except the Pentagon, Department of Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs. In other words, our international programs including military aid to Israel, Afghanistan, and other important countries, will be frozen or cut. The FBI can't hire more people, and federal prisons will have to stop expanding. But the TSA can buy more full-body scanners and hire more baggage checkers because they are "security."
What's interesting on congressional reform is that THEY DON'T PLEDGE TO STOP EARMARKS. They say all bills have to contain a citation to the constitutional authority for the measure and they promise not to bundle controversial bills with "must pass" measures and they will allow amendments to cut spending, but don't mention allowing increases or transfers. Seems like pretty weak tea.
I was struck by what it says regarding national security and congressional reform.
The Republican leaders pledge to "provide the resources,authority, and support our deployed military requires, fully fund missile defense, and enforce sanctions against Iran." I shouldn't be surprised, but missile defense is already getting $10 billion per year with little yet to show for it. They also pledge to freeze hiring and cap spending at 2008 levels for non-security discretionary accounts. What's that? It's everything except the Pentagon, Department of Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs. In other words, our international programs including military aid to Israel, Afghanistan, and other important countries, will be frozen or cut. The FBI can't hire more people, and federal prisons will have to stop expanding. But the TSA can buy more full-body scanners and hire more baggage checkers because they are "security."
What's interesting on congressional reform is that THEY DON'T PLEDGE TO STOP EARMARKS. They say all bills have to contain a citation to the constitutional authority for the measure and they promise not to bundle controversial bills with "must pass" measures and they will allow amendments to cut spending, but don't mention allowing increases or transfers. Seems like pretty weak tea.
discounting Woodward
Bob Woodward's new book is out. Here's a very informative review. I've ordered it; I'll read it, especially looking for things to assign students to illustrate the policy process. But I won't believe it all.
Insider books are valuable for the rest of us because they are the first draft of history and are available long before the reflective memoirs and declassified documents. Woodward usually has excellent access to the key players, who try to spin him to see things their way. You can usually tell who is a source, because they tend to get sympathetic treatment and favorable adjectives. Those who refuse to cooperate do so at their peril, for their side of the story doesn't get included.
Woodward's style is narrative, not analysis or assessment. That leads him to emphasize conflict, whether or not the conflict, which is inevitable in policymaking, was deep or persistent. But since I read newspapers and mystery novels, I enjoy finding out 'who shot John."
Insider books are valuable for the rest of us because they are the first draft of history and are available long before the reflective memoirs and declassified documents. Woodward usually has excellent access to the key players, who try to spin him to see things their way. You can usually tell who is a source, because they tend to get sympathetic treatment and favorable adjectives. Those who refuse to cooperate do so at their peril, for their side of the story doesn't get included.
Woodward's style is narrative, not analysis or assessment. That leads him to emphasize conflict, whether or not the conflict, which is inevitable in policymaking, was deep or persistent. But since I read newspapers and mystery novels, I enjoy finding out 'who shot John."
Saturday, September 18, 2010
enough to make a buzzard puke
Years ago, an older and wiser Senate staff colleague used to respond to outrageous examples of political demagoguery by saying, "It's enough to make a buzzard puke."
I'm feeling that way more often lately. I used to excuse inconsistencies and flipped arguments as just like lawyers picking the best arguments for their specific case. Now I see their comments as rank hypocrisy.
I'm thinking of Members of Congress who assert their war powers only when an opposition leader controls the White House and who accept executive assertiveness when their own leader is in charge. I'm thinking of self-professed budget hawks who turn into meek puppies [not Blue Dogs] when they have a rare chance to capture lost revenues. I'm thinking of those who want to limit or even cut health programs for civilians but who never are willing to deal with the soaring costs of military medical benefits beyond service-connected problems. I'm thinking of those senior military officers who oppose gays in uniform by offering exactly the same arguments -- "people would feel uncomfortable sharing the same living quarters and that would weaken morale and combat effectiveness" -- that were made in opposition to racial integration of the services in 1948.
I'm sure you can give additional examples of this phenomenon. Isn't it outrageous?
I'm feeling that way more often lately. I used to excuse inconsistencies and flipped arguments as just like lawyers picking the best arguments for their specific case. Now I see their comments as rank hypocrisy.
I'm thinking of Members of Congress who assert their war powers only when an opposition leader controls the White House and who accept executive assertiveness when their own leader is in charge. I'm thinking of self-professed budget hawks who turn into meek puppies [not Blue Dogs] when they have a rare chance to capture lost revenues. I'm thinking of those who want to limit or even cut health programs for civilians but who never are willing to deal with the soaring costs of military medical benefits beyond service-connected problems. I'm thinking of those senior military officers who oppose gays in uniform by offering exactly the same arguments -- "people would feel uncomfortable sharing the same living quarters and that would weaken morale and combat effectiveness" -- that were made in opposition to racial integration of the services in 1948.
I'm sure you can give additional examples of this phenomenon. Isn't it outrageous?
Thursday, September 16, 2010
Rue Britannia
I suppose I'm an Anglophile. I lived in London for a glorious year as a Fulbright scholar. I've traveled to Britain several times. I devour books on Churchill and World War II, and sample volumes on other periods of British history. My very first published article, at the end of my Fulbright year, was on the Labour Party's defence policy [sic on spelling]. I've subscribed to the Economist off and on over the years, and now even have time to read it.
Hence my feeling of sadness as I read the Economist's latest article on British defence policy. The Cameron government has even established a National Security Council [in the old days, the body that mattered was the Committee on Imperial Defence] and is undertaking a comprehensive strategic and budgetary review.
Lots of luck. Britain faces a smaller version of what the United States faces: expensive military capabilities confronting a restrictive fiscal environment. We shall see whether the new coalition government makes tough choices or papers them over for a while.
Meanwhile, the United States faces similar choices of whether or how to trim requirements and commitments, or military capabilities, or certain lines of expenditure. Like Britain, we have the studies, internal and external. But those analyses can never answer the big strategic questions. That requires a whole of government, and whole of society, judgment.
Hence my feeling of sadness as I read the Economist's latest article on British defence policy. The Cameron government has even established a National Security Council [in the old days, the body that mattered was the Committee on Imperial Defence] and is undertaking a comprehensive strategic and budgetary review.
Lots of luck. Britain faces a smaller version of what the United States faces: expensive military capabilities confronting a restrictive fiscal environment. We shall see whether the new coalition government makes tough choices or papers them over for a while.
Meanwhile, the United States faces similar choices of whether or how to trim requirements and commitments, or military capabilities, or certain lines of expenditure. Like Britain, we have the studies, internal and external. But those analyses can never answer the big strategic questions. That requires a whole of government, and whole of society, judgment.
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
second thoughts on nation-building
In recent years, I've subscribed to the view that the United States can shape overseas governments at least to be relatively stable and benign to our interests, if not actually free and democratic. I read how well we performed this task in postwar Japan and Germany, and dismissed our failures as special cases. I also endorsed recommendations to strengthen our civilian capacity to help in stabilization and reconstruction missions.
Now I'm having second thoughts. At best we seem only to have lucked out in Iraq, after years of trial and error. And while I want to believe that counterinsurgency theory will work in practice, the results so far in Afghanistan are far from encouraging. Then I came across a reference to an academic book review that looks at the literature on nation-building and raises further doubts in my mind. The author, Jason Brownlee, argues persuasively that the United States has succeeded in building viable states only where the right preconditions already existed, including well-functioning government at all levels and political institutions.
This isn't just an American problem, for the international community has also done a lousy job turning its interventions -- in Somalia, Congo, the Balkans -- into peaceful and viable entities.
Now I'm having second thoughts. At best we seem only to have lucked out in Iraq, after years of trial and error. And while I want to believe that counterinsurgency theory will work in practice, the results so far in Afghanistan are far from encouraging. Then I came across a reference to an academic book review that looks at the literature on nation-building and raises further doubts in my mind. The author, Jason Brownlee, argues persuasively that the United States has succeeded in building viable states only where the right preconditions already existed, including well-functioning government at all levels and political institutions.
This isn't just an American problem, for the international community has also done a lousy job turning its interventions -- in Somalia, Congo, the Balkans -- into peaceful and viable entities.
Friday, September 10, 2010
conflicting goals and unintended consequences
I am also not an expert on Afghanistan. So I read with dismay but not surprise the Washington Post article saying that U.S. anti-corruption efforts in that country may have made things worse.
The United States has numerous, and not always compatible, goals in Afghanistan. ALready we have seen conflicts between the desire to strengthen the central government in Kabul and the desire to strengthen local warlords who are willing to fight the Taliban. Our aid programs are torn between U.S.-managed efficiency and accountability and locally empowered contractors who are accustomed to bribes and favoritism. We want Afghanistan to have a modern banking system but don't like the cronyism and overseas villas of the current banking leadership.
I hope U.S. officials have a clear sense of these inevitable conflicts and have a set of priorities that can allow them to navigate through them.
The United States has numerous, and not always compatible, goals in Afghanistan. ALready we have seen conflicts between the desire to strengthen the central government in Kabul and the desire to strengthen local warlords who are willing to fight the Taliban. Our aid programs are torn between U.S.-managed efficiency and accountability and locally empowered contractors who are accustomed to bribes and favoritism. We want Afghanistan to have a modern banking system but don't like the cronyism and overseas villas of the current banking leadership.
I hope U.S. officials have a clear sense of these inevitable conflicts and have a set of priorities that can allow them to navigate through them.
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