a policymaker looks at history

 

 

Who needs another 549-page history of American foreign policy? Maybe you do. At least you should take a look at Robert Zoellick’s America in the World (Twelve, 2020). The author is not a trained historian, but a broadly experienced Washington policymaker who has served as U.S. Trade Representative, White House Deputy Chief of Staff, and State Department Under Secretary, Counselor, and Deputy Secretary as well as President of the World Bank.

Zoellick has written an incomplete, episodic, but insightful history of the most significant American policies abroad.  Organized around key figures from Alexander Hamilton and John Quincy Adams through John Hay and Charles Evans Hughes to recent U.S. Presidents, Zoellick sees economic and trade policies as important to his analyses as the traditional security narratives. That in itself is a useful corrective and valuable addition to our histories.

Time and again he offers personal anecdotes echoing his discussions of earlier events. For example, he concludes his analysis of the failure of Lyndon Johnson’s staff to warn him of their own doubts about Vietnam by citing times when his own bosses failed to give their presidents bad news. And he tells how Secretary of State James Baker paved the way for sensitive negotiations by making repeated face-saving concessions to another diplomat.

What I found especially new and valuable were his chapters on Charles Evans Hughes and Elihu Root. The first explains how America got into the diplomacy of arms control and the second is the best I’ve ever read about how legalism came to dominate U.S. foreign policy. His Cordell Hull chapter describes how the Tennessee lawmaker brought a radical change in trade policy. He uses Vannevar Bush to explain how the U.S. government embraced technological innovation for military security and economic prosperity.

He cites other historians with alternative views of post-1945 controversies and then adds his own assessments. He sprinkles his chapters with revealing incidents.

There’s not much about 21^st century foreign policy except passing references, but his perspectives on America’s first two centuries are quite worthwhile.

What happened in Afghanistan?

 

Who lost Afghanistan? is the wrong question. It assumes agency, when few complex events are monocausal, and it seeks to assign blame, where responsibilities are widely shared. Better to ask, why did things turn out that way?

In his wide-ranging and detailed study of the conflict in Afghanistan during 2001-2021, The American War in Afghanistan [Oxford University Press],Carter Malkasian finds many moments of missed opportunities for peace and many questionable decisions that made things worse. A Pashto-speaking civilian working in Afghanistan who later served as a special assistant to CJCS General Dunford, Malkasian knows both American and Taliban officials as well as the territory and culture of Afghanistan.

The war brought benefits to many Afghans, but it also built resistance to outsiders that has long been a feature of Afghan history. “Afghanistan cleaved into an urban democracy and a rural Islamic order,” Malkasian writes. He mentions the impact of government incompetence and corruption and the role of Pakistan support for the Taliban, but ultimately concludes that the Taliban fighters had a greater willingness to kill and to be killed than their opponents. [He notes that one Taliban leader proudly sent his own son as a suicide bomber.]

“[T]he Taliban stood for what it meant to be Afghan.…Tainted by its alignment with the United States, the [Kabul] government had a much weaker claim to these values and thus a much harder time motivating supporters to go to the same lengths.”

Malkasian documents many consequential choices made by the Americans:

- refusing to allow any power sharing with the Taliban;

- failing to do much to build up the Afghan army and police during 2001-5 [in part of course, because of the U.S. turn to fight a war in Iraq];

- U.S. military tactics that killed many civilians and alienated others;

- overly optimistic U.S. generals that their ways would work;

- insufficient U.S. air strikes in 2014-15;

- ruptured relations with the Karzai government;

- mishandled peace talks in 2019-20 that rewarded the Taliban while leaving many crucial issues unsettled.

Maybe we need to revise the adage and conclude that defeat, not victory, has 100 fathers in this case.