Philip Zelikow, academic, diplomat, and executive director of the 9/11 commission, has written an excellent book with a deeply tragic story. The Road Less Traveled [Public Affairs, 2021] analyzes Woodrow Wilson's failed effort to launch peace talks that could have ended the bloody conflict in Europe and kept the United States out of the war.
Zelikow knows how government works from the inside. He also co-authored the second edition of Graham Allison's Essence of Decision, the landmark work on bureaucratic politics analysis. He uses that background to explain the many ways in which good intentions for peace were scuttled by zealots for war.
Among his assessments:
- Woodrow Wilson wanted to shepherd a peace conference but didn't understand how to craft the diplomacy. He was more angry with Britain than Germany as late as January 31, 1917.
- Wilson was undermined by his close adviser, Edward House, who miscommunicated many of Wilson's views to European diplomats and personally wanted to join the war in support of Britain.
- Wilson was also undermined by his senior State Department officials, who also favored joining the war with the Allies and who failed to turn Wilson's goals into a plan.
- Germany's civilian government desperately wanted peace and offered substantial concessions, but they were ultimately overruled by the military high command, who promised the kaiser a quick victory through submarine warfare.
- The British government was ready to accept peace talks in the fall of 1916, only to be out-maneuvered and then replaced by David Lloyd George, who privately believed the war couldn't be won yet publicly vowed a fight to the finish. [His plan for victory envisioned battles in the Balkans and Turkey.]
- The French and Russian governments faced growing public opposition to continuing the war and would likely have agreed to a status quo ante bellum peace.
If only experienced career diplomats had developed a plan for launching peace talks...
If only Wilson had pushed ahead and forced his subordinates to act on that plan...
If only the British had recognized their desperate financial situation and acted while Asquith was still prime minister...
If only the German Chancellor had persuaded the kaiser to delay the return to unrestricted submarine warfare...
The United States would not have entered the war. [Wilson had already cut off British access to US loans.]
Russia might not have had its revolutions and ultimately a communist takeover.
Postwar Europe would not have been so disrupted by political unrest and military conflict.
I've spent a lot of time over the years studying the outbreak of war in 1914. Since historians usually only write about things that have happened, it's rare to have such a solid work about something that almost happened. Zelikow has profound lessons for practitioners on how ideas get turned into policies and policies processed into accomplishments.
