forever wars

The title was provocative: Why America Loses Wars. The author, Donald Stoker, has taught at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. So I read the book...and was profoundly disappointed.

Stoker doesn't like "forever wars." Neither do I. His critique of vague and changing goals in U.S. military operations after 1945 is reasonable. I believe policymakers should think carefully, weigh options, give clear policy guidance, especially to the military, and then frequently reassess whether ends, means, and ways are in balance.

But Stoker seems to believe that limited wars become forever wars. My problem is that unlimited wars can spiral out of control. There are strategic and moral reasons to keep conflicts limited.

Another book I've just read, Austin Carson's Secret Wars, show how often nations collude to keep secret their enemy's covert operations in order to limit escalation. I never knew, for example, that U.S. officials knew that Russian pilots were engaged in Korea but chose not to make that public. Carson, who teaches at the University of Chicago, also shows how American and enemy officials colluded to keep important facts about covert operations secret in the Vietnam and Afghan wars.

Carson's analysis thus provides another reason for keeping wars limited that makes sense to me.

FDR unsurpassed

Franklin D. Roosevelt was exceptional in many ways, but a new book by a Stony Brook professor demonstrates his amazing popularity. Helmut Norpoth's Unsurpassed: The Popular Appeal of Franklin Roosevelt (Oxford U. Press, 2018) draws upon little-studied opinion surveys from 1937-45 and beyond to make these points:

• FDR's approval rating his 70% in January, 1941 and stayed there or higher for the rest of his presidency. [One slight dip to 67% in November 1943.]
• His push for large defense budgets after 1938 not only slashed unemployment rates but also boosted his own approval ratings. [Throughout the book, Norpoth argues that FDR's foreign policies helped increase his political support.]
• The turning point, when American opinion shifted from avoiding war to supporting Britain even at the risk of war, came in the summer of 1940 after the fall of France. [At the same time, opinion jumped from opposing a third term to supporting the idea.]
• Unlike postwar presidents, FDR saw no loss of support as the casualties and costs of the war mounted.
• The point when public opinion first concluded that America would win the war -- jumping from 45% to 80% -- came just after the landings in North Africa in November, 1942. The numbers stayed that high or higher for the rest of the war. [This outcome underscores why FDR pushed so hard, but unsuccessfully, for the operation to begin before the 1942 congressional elections, when Democrats suffered substantial losses.]
• Being commander-in-chief probably tipped the balance for FDR in both 1940 and 1944. Surveys at the time showed the GOP candidates winning if there were no war.
• Soldiers voted for FDR in 1944 in large numbers [estimated at least 62%] and stayed Democrats long afterward. [Lincoln got 77% of Union soldiers' votes in 1864.]

My own research convinced me that FDR followed the polls closely and pushed things to the limits, especially in 1940-41, when he felt public opinion would be supportive. Norpoth also links his fireside chats as important devices to boost and sustain public approval of his policies. The evidence in the book lives up to its title.