Congress and the navy

I ordered the book Congress Buys a Navy [U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2016] by naval historian Paul Pedisich hoping to find a story of how farsighted lawmakers overcame reluctant presidents and built a fleet for a global power role during the years it covers, 1881-1921. Instead I found a chronology of parochialism and porkbarrel politics. Hardly anyone in either the executive or legislative branch had a vision of a future navy, just requests for new ships a year at a time.

Pedisich tells how Congress repeatedly rejected proposals for navy reorganization because it valued the patronage possibilities in the service's 8 bureau system. He documents recurring fights over whether to build ships in navy shipyards or private ones. And prior to the Spanish-American war of 1898, Congress forced delays in actual ship construction by demanding that contractors meet a $300 per ton price for armor plate, far below the industry standard of $400-500.

Eventually, spurred by the 1898 war and later by a rearmament binge in 1916, Congress did build a navy "second to none." But it was accomplished without a strategic plan and only by compromises to serve member interests.

Pedisich mentions but does not seem to recognize the significance of one development that I think explains why Congress actually put serious money into naval modernization in the mid-1880s. In 1885, the House gave its naval affairs committee the power to write appropriations bills. Until then, that panel approved bills authorizing new ship programs, but they were ignored and slashed by the appropriations committee. The Senate made a similar change after 1898, and the navy committees retained appropriations power until after World War I. The power to shape actual money bills greatly improved the legislative chances of naval expansionists.

One reason Congress reverted to single appropriations committees in the early 1920s was to avoid the overspending by the many committees that could both authorize and appropriate. Lesson learned.

best SecDef?

A writer for Tom Ricks' blog draws attention to a recent interview by former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates praising  two of his predecessors, Mel Laird [under Nixon] and Harold Brown [under Carter]. I share Gates' admiration and would add Bill Perry, Brown's deputy and later Clinton's second SecDef.

My own study of those who have held that office, SecDef: the nearly impossible job of Secretary of Defense, was published just before Gates took office in 2006. I praised Laird, Brown, and Perry as unsung heroes who performed all of their key tasks with great skill, and did not join the ranks of 1/3 of the Pentagon leaders who were fired or forced to resign. In addition to managing the department, the secretary has to maintain good relations with the President and other members of the National Security Council, with the military leadership, and with the Congress. He also functions as a war planner and an important diplomat.

Gates himself would rank first in my judgment. He maintained the confidence of two quite different presidents and kept strong congressional support, despite his own contempt for politicians, which he revealed only in his memoir. He also made many good calls -- in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in reorienting military thinking to the most urgent tasks, and in demanding accountability. He even fired people, which few of his predecessors had ever done.

problem without a solution

Bill Bishop, who made us aware that a "Big Sort" had turned America into islands of like-minded people, has a discouraging piece in the Post detailing the enormous loss of trust in most institutions, except for the military. It has happened mainly since the 1970s [hello, Vietnam! hello, Watergate!].

While there have probably been multiple causes including individual self-absoprtion and a decline in community engagement, Bishop offers no remedies to restore trust.

I don't have any far-reaching ideas to offer either. Congress and the presidency can help their own situation by getting things done -- and that means centrist compromises. The news media are too numerous and fractured to save themselves as a group, but individual organizations can triumph through professionalism rather than partisanship. The counter example of the U.S. military offers a potential model -- of accomplishment, professionalism, nonpartisanship [mostly, so far], and built-in self-criticism mechanisms.

Trust can't be demanded; it has t be earned.